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‘New Wars’ in Contemporary China? 
Introduction: 
The post cold war period has witnessed the rise of a new group of conflicts, which well 
known academics such as Mary Kaldor has called ‘New Wars’1 to differentiate the current group of 
conflicts from earlier  wars that are in keeping with the classical definition of warfare. Kaldor’s thesis, 
although originally formulated in an East European context at an earlier period, has considerable 
explanatory power and it is without doubt that the theory still travels far and wide. Scholars have 
had a tendency to use the ‘New War’ argument within the context of Eastern Europe, the Middle 
East and Sub Saharan Africa. It is the aim of this paper to go beyond these conventional case studies 
and use the ‘New War’ theory to understand conflicts in different parts of contemporary China and 
to see to what extent this ‘New War’ theory fits in with the Chinese context and helps us to 
understand them. Thus, this paper introduces a new set of case studies: Xinjiang and Tibet.  
Conflicts that are classified as ‘new’ or ‘post-Cold War’ are not really post-cold war/post 90’s 
in the strict sense of the term, since there are always short term factors and long term factors that 
lead to the outbreak of a conflict, and some of the long term factors can actually be traced back to 
pre-cold war or even earlier times. Thus, the case studies chosen for this paper are ‘new’ or ‘post 
Cold War’ conflicts in the sense that the levels of violence in some cases have escalated more than 
ever in the post 90’s phase, although the long term causes can be traced back to earlier times. In 
Tibet, for instance, we saw a huge uprising that took place in the year 2008. In relation to Xinjiang, 
Michael Clarke writes, ‘China became more concerned regarding the security of Xinjiang with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.’2 Furthermore, these conflicts have gone on to acquire the 
characteristic features of what Kaldor calls ‘New Wars’. This paper is not so much interested in 
looking at the intricate details of the individual conflicts but to what extent does the Kaldor thesis fit 
in within the Asian context. This paper has an emphasis on China’s contested borderland regions, 
Xinjiang and Tibet. This paper has chosen China as its chief case study because it is one of the two 
new rising economic giants on the Asiatic mainland, the other one being India. After the Asian Tiger 
economies reached near industrialised/miracle status, much attention has shifted to the mainland of 
Asia with a special focus on China. In a world of increasing interconnectedness, developments in a 
rising Asia will invariably affect our lives in the west in one way or another. Thus, in an era of 
globalisation, the problems in Inner Asia or what may seem to be a remote part of Asia could have a 
profound impact on our lives in the western world.  
‘New Wars’ and Kaldor: 
Kaldor’s New War theory is most certainly a powerful argument and travels far and wide to 
explain most present day conflicts including some of the conflicts in inner Asia. The early chapters of 
the book, ‘Old and New Wars’ look at some of the characteristic features of what Kaldor calls ‘New 
Wars’. ‘New Wars’, according to Kaldor refer to those conflicts that started to take place in the 90’s 
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and refer to a new form of political violence which must be distinguished from old wars. In these 
new wars, she argues, it has become difficult to differentiate between the ‘global’ and the ‘local’, 
‘the political’ and the non political, acts of aggression or external attacks and acts of repression or 
internal attacks. These wars need to be understood and analysed within the broader framework of 
globalisation. Kaldor argues, ‘New Wars are the wars of the era of globalisation’.3 We notice 
pronounced identity politics in these wars and the participation of the diaspora. The presence of the 
armed forces and paramilitary is also strong in these new wars. We see that these new group of 
wars are funded differently from the way older wars were funded, such as the diaspora might 
provide these conflicts with the necessary funding. In earlier times, wars tended to be funded 
through state revenue. In these conflicts we see the presence of both ‘global’ and ‘local’ actors. The 
‘global’ refers to UN peacekeeping missions, humanitarian or liberal intervention, the presence of 
international NGO’s and the presence of the specialised agencies of the UN. The ‘local’ refers to 
indigenous actors such as war lords, local political actors, Islamists etc. These are some of the 
characteristic features of what Kaldor calls ‘New Wars’. Kaldor also talks about the sharp economic 
divide between ‘the global’ and ‘the local’. These ‘New War’ conflict zones are also prone to human 
rights abuses. ‘New Wars involve a blurring of the distinctions between war, organised crime and 
large scale violations of human rights’.  Although these wars are localised, they involve a myriad of 
transnational connections. New wars also arise in the context of the erosion of state autonomy, in 
other words disintegration of the state. New wars occur in situations in which state revenues decline 
because of the decline of the economy and polity and also amidst criminality, corruption and 
inefficiency of failed or collapsed states.   
Let us now see how this thesis fits in with the Chinese context. The ‘New War’ argument is a 
multi-faceted argument. We will see that some of these facets fit in with the Chinese case.  
Chinese Xinjiang:  
 Geographically, Xinjiang is located in China’s extreme far North West. It is China’s largest 
province and has a massive border with the Islamic republics of Central Asia. ‘Currently, the region 
comprises 18% of modern China’s territory.’4 The ethnic community in this province includes the 
predominantly Muslim Uyghur community who claim to be a part of East Turkestan or Uyghuristan 
and not a part of China.5 China’s atheistic character did not go down well with the Uyghur 
community of Xinjiang who felt and still feel very strongly about their Islamic identity. ‘Formal 
education in Xinjiang before the Qing re-conquest of the 1870’s was generally Islamic.’6  Enze Han 
writes, ‘The Uyghurs’ cultural grievances mainly result from two factors: The first is the Chinese 
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government’s strict control of Islam in Xinjiang. The second factor is the chipping away of Uyghur-
language education from the school curriculum in Xinjiang.’7  For instance, originally Uyghur pupils 
would start studying Mandarin Chinese from middle school, but in 1984, the language was pushed 
down to the third grade, and currently they start studying it from the first grade.8  In addition to 
cultural grievances, Enze Han also talks about the political and economic grievances. ‘One commonly 
cited factor to which Uyghur’s continual grievance is attributed is the repressive tactics employed by 
the Chinese state. Chinese state policies toward political dissent have always been harsh, particularly 
when ethnic separatism is involved. For example at the end of April, 1996, the Chinese government 
launched its first Strike Hard/Yanda campaign.’9  From an economic standpoint, Xinjiang is estimated 
to have 35.7 billion tons of oil and 22 trillion cubic metres of natural gas. China’s current strategy is 
to ‘ship oil and natural gas from Xinjiang to its eastern provinces.’10 Xinjiang is rich in not just oil and 
gas, but also cotton and other resources.11 
The Uyghur’s have been quick to assert their differences from mainstream Han Chinese 
people and this politics of difference has always unsettled officials in Beijing. ‘Rising Uyghur ethnic 
consciousness in the post 1978 era is believed to be related to tense Uyghur-Han (Han being the 
dominant racial group in China) relations and conflicts in Xinjiang’.12 Nimrod Baranovitch writes, ‘a 
large body of literature makes clear that although the state plays a dominant role in the definition 
and representation of ethnic identities in China, ethnicity is a negotiated process and minorities are 
active agents in the negotiation of their ethnic identities.’13 The Chinese political establishment has 
tried to undermine the local identity of the Uyghur’s by trying to ‘Hanify’ Xinjiang by sending more 
and more racial Han Chinese people to the region and to take up jobs there. It was argued that 
ethnic minorities would not be able to develop without the assistance of the so called advanced Han 
nationality. Thus Han determinism replaced self determinism. Although China argues that this Han 
migration is being done for purposes of economic development and to raise the material standards 
of the local Uyghur people, substantial evidence shows that the economic benefits are going down 
to the Han Chinese and are being concentrated in their hands rather than trickling down to the local 
Uyghur community.14 This has exacerbated the situation and made the Uyghur community fiercer in 
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asserting their Islamic identity and distinctiveness. For instance, ‘posters of Mahmud Qashqari and 
Yusup Hajib, two historical figures that the Uyghur consider their cultural heroes, have been widely 
distributed in Xinjiang, which in obvious contrast to the official Chinese versions that stress Xinjiang 
has been an inseparable part of China since antiquity, these posters link the Uyghur’s to a whole new 
world and to another history and civilisation’.15 The Uyghur people by an large have been excluded 
from the decision making process with regard to development in Xinjiang and yet they are expected 
to feel grateful to the Chinese for ‘developing’ their region. Well known scholar and expert on China, 
Jackie Sheehan, argues that the colonial attitude16 that the Chinese from the heartland have towards 
the ethnic minorities of the peripheral borderland regions has galvanised the Uyghur’s into action, 
asserting their disticnt identity more than ever, thereby strengthening the ETIM or the East 
Turkestan Islamic Movement and in the process delegitimizing China’s claim over Xinjiang. The 
Chinese have always viewed cultural differences especially religious differences with considerable 
suspicion. It was feared that religious differences might undermine state values, state definitions of 
nationalism and ‘patriotic’ ideology. Identity politics is, thus, very pronounced in the context of 
Xinjiang, which is also one of the aspects of the ‘New War’ thesis. ‘Asymmetric economic 
development and neglect of identity issues seem to be the bane of Xinjiang province in China’.17 
Kaldor’s theory talks about the strong presence of the paramilitary and armed forces in 
these conflicts. This aspect of the ‘New War’ theory fits in with the Xinjiang context in the sense that 
from time to time the Chinese state has used the paramilitary and armed forces to crush the Uyghur 
uprisings. For instance, the people’s militia was deployed to arrest insurgents and other subversive 
elements who were threatening to undermine the Chinese state and national patriotic ideology. 
‘East Turkestan has been under military control by Communist China since 1949’.18 The violent 
outbreaks in Xinjiang are sporadic. Thus, Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, writes, ‘A heavy police presence is 
a constant in Xinjiang’.19 
  Another aspect of Kaldor’s thesis is that these ‘new’ conflicts need to be studied within the 
broader context of globalisation. Furthermore, boundaries between nation states are increasingly 
becoming blurred, and although conflicts in this day and age may seem to be localised, there may be 
strong transnational connections and a strong role played by external actors. Uyghur nationalism has 
been inspired by central Asians. The ETIM in particular, is believed to have been inspired by the 
political Islam of the AF Pak region and to some extent Iran. Uyghur militants have been spotted in 
the AF-PAK region. In an era of globalisation, activists and insurgents also make use technology. 
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‘International campaigns for Uyghur rights and possible independence have become increasingly 
vocal and well organised, especially on the internet’.20 ‘Globalisation is affecting the development of 
Islam in China in a variety of ways. China is becoming part of the Islamic revival, which has become a 
global phenomenon over the last few decades. A certain kind of international Islam has become 
involved in strengthening Uyghur identity just as it has become enmeshed with ethno nationalist 
movements in various parts of the world. Thus, Stephen Blank, writes, ‘this increasing violence 
clearly stems from the globalisation of violence, including terrorism that pervades much of the 
Muslim world, and from the general growth in Xinjiang’s global links of all kinds.’21 It could be argued 
that some of the aspects of the ‘New War’ thesis intertwine with other aspects of the thesis. For 
instance, in this case, globalisation, which Kaldor mentions, intertwines with identity and identity 
politics, which Kaldor also talks about. Technology has been crucial in spreading awareness of the 
problem in Xinjiang. As a result of this awareness, Muslims from other parts of the Islamic world, 
who feel strongly about their Islamic sense of collective identity, will come and join their Muslim 
Uyghur brothers to fight against Chinese oppression or what is perceived as Chinese oppression.  
Globalisation has also increased the inequality of the Uyghur community and has thus led to much 
polarisation within the Chinese context. The Hans have benefitted from the process in comparison 
to the Uyghurs. Growing inter connectedness often creates new animosities and conflicts, which can 
in turn fuel reactionary politics and deep seated xenophobia, which we see in the context of 
Xinjiang. The region is also rich in natural resources, which the Chinese mainland would like to make 
use of in order to become a global super power. 
 Kaldor talks about how these conflicts happen in a situation of erosion of state authority. 
This applies to Xinjiang, since the ETIM is essentially a secessionist movement.  
 Kaldor is also right in suggesting that in these new conflicts it has become increasingly hard 
to distinguish between the ‘external’ and the ‘internal’. With regard to the Xinjiang conflict, this is 
very much the case. Although from the Uyghur standpoint, the Han Chinese presence in Xinjiang is 
viewed as external because the Uyghur’s do not see themselves as a part of China but as a distinct 
nation in their own right, from an outsiders point of view, this distinction cannot always be made 
easily since China sees Xinjiang as an ‘integral’ part of China, and has done everything it can to sinify 
or hanify the region, so that Xinjiang resembles China proper.  
 Kaldor is also correct in her point about the participation of the diaspora in ‘new wars’. With 
regard to Xinjiang, Beijing has blamed the Uyghur diaspora for stirring up violence within China 
especially in Xinjiang. In this connection, mention maybe made of Rebiya Kadeer and her efforts to 
free Xinjiang. She is the leader of the Uyghur community and although based in the United States, 
she fiercely supports the movement for a free East Turkestan from exile.22   
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Xinjiang is prone to human rights violations.23 This is also very much in keeping with the 
‘New War’ thesis.  
The Case of Tibet: 
 The situation in Tibet is quite similar to the situation in Xinjiang. For starters, it is essentially 
a secessionist movement and thus happens in a context of China’s state authority being eroded. This 
is in keeping with the ‘New War’ thesis, since Kaldor mentions that ‘new wars’ end to take place in a 
context where state authority is increasingly being weakened.  
Tibet, like Xinjiang, is also a deeply religious province. ‘Monastery education dominated 
before 1951, and still exerts a strong influence.’24 The only difference is that whilst Xinjiang is 
predominantly Muslim, Tibet is predominantly Buddhist. The complicated situation in Tibet has 
occurred partly because the pronounced cultural differences, especially religious differences, do not 
go down well with the Chinese state. This is because cultural values distinct from mainland China are 
seen to be eroding mainstream state values, nationalism and patriotic fervour. Religious groups in 
China have been strongly associated with secret societies and have been known for their 
underground activities in trying to topple the Chinese government throughout Chinese history.25   
 The issue of Tibetan national identity involves the question, to what extent is Tibet or was 
Tibet a distinct nation? Tibetans have argued that they were always a distinct nation but China, on 
the other hand has denied this. China argues that Tibet is an integral part of China and that China 
has exercised sovereign authority over Tibet for 700 years.26 The Nationalities Affairs Commission 
was meant to pursue a policy of uniting the region with mainstream China or China proper. ‘The 
trajectory of Chinese nationality policies is reflected in discrimination against minorities, the 
weakening of minority autonomous institutions in the 1950’s, the attack on minority cultures and 
autonomy during the cultural revolution in the sixties and finally the modernisation agenda featuring 
the centralising and assimilating power of education and propaganda systems since the 80’s’.27  The 
Dalai Lama’s administration in Tibet had been abolished which was replaced by the prepatory 
committee for the TAR [Tibetan Autonomous Region], as the official government of the region. After 
1959, China launched a full campaign to integrate Tibet economically, politically and militarily. The 
policy of Han migration also followed, which began to undermine local Tibetan Buddhist identity.28  
Abanti Bhattacharya writes, ‘The Chinese state, which calls for submerging all minority identities 
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within the predominant Han identity in the larger cause of national cohesion and security, has 
effectively precluded the possibility of Tibetan assertions of identity and political autonomy.’29 ‘For 
China’s stability and prosperity, it is critical that all its nationalities identify with China.’30 A series of 
so called patriotic campaigns were designed to encourage Tibetans including the clergy to support 
integration within China.31 Tibetans have feared in recent years that they will become a minority in 
their own land due to the Han migration and inter racial marriages introduced and encouraged by 
the state. In other words, there is a strong fear amongst local Tibetans that they will lose their 
distinct cultural identity. Like Xinjiang, it is the Hans who control the Tibetan economy and Tibetan 
administration. Tibetans cannot compete with the Han, who tend to be more skilled professionally. 
Tibetans, like the Uyghur community in Xinjiang, have been excluded from the decision making 
process as far as development in the region is concerned. Development means different things to 
different people and what it means to Tibetans is not what it means to the Chinese state.  
Furthermore, the development is unbalanced across localities.32 Despite protests, the Han migration 
or Han flood has continued that has paved the way for a new and formidable pro China constituency 
in the region that has increased China’s security in Tibet.33 Thus, at the heart of the problem is 
identity and identity politics, which is one of the aspects of Kaldor’s ‘New War’ thesis. Kendrick Kuo 
writes, ‘in public statements, China has grouped East Turkestan terrorists with Tibetan and 
Taiwanese independence advocates. Religious adherents are viewed monolithically so that when 
devotees use a religious group to push for political ends, all followers of that religion are treated as 
co-conspirators.’34 
 In keeping with the Kaldor ‘New War’ thesis, we also see the participation of the diaspora 
who are actively trying to raise awareness of the Tibetan issue internationally. For instance, ‘The 
exiled Tibetans in India have led a vociferous campaign for a separation of Tibet from China and have 
been able to exploit China’s dependency on foreign powers to promote their interests. The US has 
been receptive to exiled Tibetan propaganda, which has also been mixed up with a highly loaded 
human rights crusade against China’.35 
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 The region has also been subject to human rights abuses and police brutality. The strong 
presence of the armed forces and para military in Tibet has paved the way for all sorts of human 
rights abuses and atrocities to take place. The PLA [People’s Liberation Army] took over Tibet in 
195036. ‘Public Security departments have taken broad responsibility to enforce regulations 
controlling religious activities and have participated actively in suppression campaigns’.37 Not only 
have many Tibetans lost their lives, but state policies have been introduced by which Tibetan 
language and resources are being systematically eroded.38  Thus, we see two features of the ‘New 
War’ thesis, that is, presence of the armed forces and the para-military, and human rights abuses in 
the Tibetan context. These two features of the ‘New War’ thesis are intertwined, since the heavy 
militarisation of Tibet has paved the way for all sorts of police brutality to take place. In March, 
2008, Tibetans rose up in the biggest challenge to Chinese authority since the fifties. ‘The Tibetan 
Government in Exile and rights groups claim that 220 Tibetans were killed, 5600 were arrested or 
detained, 1294 injured, 290 sentenced and over 1000 disappeared in the ensuing crackdown.’39 
Concluding Remarks:  
 In conclusion, it could be argued that Kaldor’s ‘New War’ thesis still has considerable 
explanatory power. It travels far and wide, and although it was originally formulated in an East 
European context, and has been used as a theoretical framework to understand conflicts in the 
Middle East and Sub Saharan Africa, it can also be used to understand conflicts in contemporary 
China. Firstly, Kaldor’s argument that these wars happen when state authority is being eroded in an 
atmosphere of corruption and criminality apply to the Chinese context. The very fact that both of 
these conflicts are essentially secessionist movements shows clearly that Chinese state authority is 
increasingly being undermined at the periphery, in its borderlands. Other aspects of the ‘New War’ 
thesis which can be found in the Chinese case include pronounced identity politics, the impact of 
globalisation, the heavy presence of the military and paramilitary and human rights abuses. 
Sometimes, one aspect of the ‘New War’ thesis might intertwine with another aspect of the thesis. 
For instance in both cases, but more so with regard to Tibet, the heavy presence of the armed forces 
has paved the way for all sorts of police brutality and human rights abuses to take place. Of course, 
there is an element of variation and the thesis cannot be applied uniformly to both the case studies. 
The thesis seems to fit in better with the Xinjiang context than with Tibet. In other words, from the 
discussion above, we can find more of the features or aspects of the ‘New War’ thesis found in the 
context of Xinjiang, than in Tibet.  
 As a solution to the above conflicts, one of course needs to look at both the short term 
factors as well as the long term factors that have caused the conflict. Measures to prevent conflict 
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can be divided into two categories: light prevention and deep prevention.40 The practitioners of 
‘light prevention’ do not necessarily concern themselves with the root causes of the conflict but 
their aim is to ‘prevent latent or threshold conflicts from becoming severe armed conflicts’.41 
Examples would include diplomatic interventions and private mediation efforts. Deep prevention, in 
contrast aims to address the root causes of the conflict which may mean engaging with issues of 
development, democracy and community relations. Since the conflicts in this paper have been going 
on for decades and are still on-going in one form or another, it is important to give serious attention 
to deep prevention. If we take the light prevention approach, the problem will continue to persist. 
Since economic, political and social realities have led to these conflicts, sound policies in these areas 
can also provide a solution. The situation in both the case studies is not broken beyond repair. Good 
governance, effective development, reducing arms, demilitarisation, increasing human rights and 
reducing the economic gap which exists between the different ethnic groups of these two provinces 
is most certainly the way forward.  
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